Not every good control is a critical control. Here’s a practical way to separate “must-work” barriers from “nice-to-have” controls—and how to prove effectiveness with clear standards and verification evidence.
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Not every good control is a critical control. Here’s a practical way to separate “must-work” barriers from “nice-to-have” controls—and how to prove effectiveness with clear standards and verification evidence.
Why this matters (and why teams get stuck)
Most organisations don’t struggle because they lack controls. They struggle because they have too many—and they treat them all the same.
That creates three problems:
The goal is simple: identify the controls that must work to prevent or mitigate high-consequence events, then run a verification rhythm that generates defensible evidence.
Definitions that remove the ambiguity
Critical controls
Controls that are essential to prevent a high-consequence event (or reduce its consequences) and must be reliably effective. If they fail, the outcome can be catastrophic or life-altering.
If this control fails, could someone die or could we suffer a major incident? If yes → you’re probably looking at a critical control candidate.
Important controls
Controls that are beneficial, often required, and absolutely worth doing—but their failure alone is unlikely to cause a catastrophic outcome, or they mainly improve consistency, compliance, and general risk reduction.
Important controls often support critical controls (training, supervision, housekeeping), but they’re not the barrier that stops the major event by itself.
A practical way to draw the line: the “Critical Control Test”
Use this set of criteria to classify a control as critical vs important. You don’t need a complex scoring model to start—just consistent, documented reasoning.
1) Link to a high-consequence scenario
A critical control must clearly connect to a top event (from your risk register, MAE register, or Bowtie).
Ask: “Which catastrophic event does this control prevent or mitigate?”
If you can’t name it, it’s probably not critical.
2) Barrier strength (does it actually stop the event?)
Critical controls are genuine barriers—not just reminders.
3) Specific and measurable performance standard
If you can’t define what ‘good’ looks like, you can’t prove it works.
A critical control should have a performance standard that answers:
If the standard reads like a slogan (“ensure equipment is safe”), it’s not ready to be critical.
4) Verifiable in operation (not just “we believe it happens”)
Critical controls must be verifiable through objective evidence.
Good verification is:
If the only evidence is “people say they do it,” it’s an important control—or it needs redesign.
5) Single-point-of-failure logic
If that control fails, do you still have other independent barriers?
6) Realistic ownership and governance
A control can’t be “critical” if nobody truly owns it, maintains it, and has authority to stop work when it fails.
Critical controls require:
Critical controls are the barriers that directly prevent or mitigate catastrophic events, which is why they need clear performance standards and must be verifiable with strong, objective evidence. When a critical control fails, it should trigger escalation and often immediate action, potentially including stop-work, and it should be checked on a disciplined cadence that matches the risk (for example, shift-based, weekly, or monthly).
Important controls, by contrast, improve overall safety and compliance and provide meaningful support, but they’re not usually the last line of defence preventing a catastrophic outcome. Evidence for important controls may be broader or more qualitative, and if they fail, the response is typically improvement actions rather than escalation or stop-work, with oversight managed through normal assurance activities and continuous improvement cycles.
Examples: What’s “critical” vs “important” in real life
Example 1: Working at heights
Top event: fall from height
Likely critical controls
Likely important controls
How you prove it
Example 2: Mobile plant interactions (construction/mining)
Top event: struck-by / run-over
Likely critical controls
Likely important controls
How you prove it
Turning Bowties into a control program that runs itself
A Bowtie is the bridge between theory and execution:
This is where many programs mature: they stop listing “controls,” and start managing control effectiveness.
A practical 7-step method to implement this in your organisation
Common pitfalls are usually easy to spot once you know what to look for. The first is treating everything as critical—if a site has 50+ “critical” controls, focus gets diluted and nothing truly stands out, so it’s better to prioritise the barriers that genuinely prevent or mitigate catastrophic outcomes. Another common issue is listing controls without clear performance standards; if you can’t define what “pass/fail” looks like, you can’t verify whether the control is actually working. Closely related is verification that becomes paperwork-only, where activity is recorded but evidence isn’t objective, traceable, or meaningful in practice. Organisations also weaken their CCM program when there’s no escalation path for failures—a critical control failure should trigger a defined response, sometimes including stop-work until the barrier is restored. Finally, controls can lose their purpose when they drift away from the risk scenarios they’re meant to manage, so keeping each control tied back to the specific high-consequence event it prevents or mitigates is essential.
How myosh supports Critical Control Management (CCM) and Bowties
Once you’ve defined what’s critical, the real challenge is execution and proof. A CCM approach typically needs:
This is the operating system of critical controls: not just defining them, but proving they’re working—consistently.